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Moral Geographies: The problem of sovereignty and indigeneity 
amongst the Nagas1 
 
‘Nagaland: A remote land of jungle, Jesus – and religious war’ reads a Daily 
Herald headline published in Illinois, America. 2  Growing up in a remote 
village of Nagaland in Northeast India during the early 1950s, David Jamir 
recounts to the Daily Herald how the sermons of Billy Graham, an American 
evangelist, wafted through the din of the monsoon rains beating the tin roof 
of his house.  Graham’s voice was unassailable.  From these sermons, David 
Jamir was able to imagine America – ‘a land where skyscrapers, not banana 
trees, ruled the skyline. A nation where Jesus was ever-present, just like in 
Nagaland’.3  Not far from Jamir’s home, Thuingaleng Muivah, a future 
national leader, recounts how even before he could read, he ‘stared at a 
picture of Christ cradling a lamb in his father’s Bible and later saw in it a 
proverb for his people.  “God has created all of creation. Nagaland is part of 
creation – and God has a purpose for it. Surely God means for us to be 
free”’.4  
 
In order to understand this larger geopolitical situation, I will show how Naga 
sovereignty, and ‘place-making’ (Muehlebach 2001) are significant to the 
Nagas’ sense of belonging.  This paper will suggest that territory is not an 
object or a place that can be fixed in time, but rather an act of narration and 
imagination with the power to shape where it belongs.  In this regard, I will 
employ two registers.  First, I will explore the importance of Christianity for 
the Nagas as they imagine their nation.  Contrasted largely with what they 
                                                      
1 A version of this paper was presented in the conference Looking beyond the State: 
Changing Forms of Inclusion and Exclusion in India held in Kohima, Nagaland.  My 
thanks to participants for engaging with the paper. Joe Doherty and Gordon Graham 
offered valuable comments on an earlier draft and Lindsay Graham has read, 
corrected, and offered critical insights throughout the writing process.  My gratitude 
to all of them.      
2 ‘A remote land of jungle, Jesus - and religious war’, Daily Herald, May 5, 2003.   
3 Like many messy nation-building projects, names are a complicated matter.  When I 
refer to Nagaland, I mean the Indian state, and I also mean ‘land of the Nagas’ as in 
Naga-land or Nagalim (a recent construction).  These are used interchangeably, but 
have more precise usage in certain contexts as will be shown.     
4 Nagaland is often viewed as the only Christian nation in Asia outside the 
Philippines.  It could possibly be the only Baptist nation in the world (Freston 2001: 
88; Eaton 2002). 
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perceive as ‘Hindu-India’, this register is pivotal in resisting the larger 
resonating force of the Indian nation-state.  Second, the United Nations (UN) 
has become a transnational arbiter that provides universal recognition of 
human rights and gives ‘moral’ weight to the Nagas’ claim for self-
determination.  This is not unique to the Nagas, but shared amongst many 
indigenous peoples (Jung 2008; Karlsson 2001; Moksnes 2007), who are now 
questioning the terms of their political exclusion.   
 
While it is important to keep these two points in mind, this paper will make 
the case that we need to rethink traditional forms of sovereignty based on a 
strong national state that orders difference.  Instead it would be more useful 
to think about sovereign territories as the organisation of space, or 
territoriality (Sack 1986) that can be viewed as a symbolic attachment to 
territory that constitutes identities, security and a sense of belonging (Robbins 
2006: 62). Robert Sack argues that territoriality is ‘intimately related to how 
people use the land’, how they ‘organize themselves in space and how they 
give meaning to place’ (Sack 1986: 2).  The ‘political’ aspect of Sack’s 
notion of territoriality is helpful in this case because it can be viewed as a 
geographic strategy, because space and society are interlinked and 
territoriality is the process that connects them (Sack 1986: 20).  This paper 
will also show the contradictions and tensions in these articulations due to the 
messy project of nation building, particularly when we consider Christianity 
and its integral relation to Naga identity.   One way to consider this issue is to 
employ, what Ranger (1993) calls, the ‘re-imaging of tradition’ that 
acknowledges the global force of indigenous politics, which destabilises the 
terrain of ethnic and Christian exclusivism.         
 
The Nagas are an interesting case to discuss these issues because it is in an 
area of Northeast India that straddles four nation-states: Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
China and Burma.5  It is an area interspersed with a mosaic of ethnic, 
religious and linguistic constellations – a ‘mountain Babel’– that has 
                                                      
5 It is connected to the rest of India by a ‘chicken neck’ corridor, around 40 km strip 
between Bangladesh and Nepal, dangling like a thread – some of its areas are closer 
to Rangoon and Bangkok than it is to New Delhi.   
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historically proved inimical to any centralised state authority (Myint-U 
2011:79). This has resulted in concentrated military presence –not least due 
to the Indo-China war of 19626, the porous international borders, and the 
demands for sovereignty by many of the indigenous populations in the area.7  
India is worried that any political and territorial compromise on Naga 
sovereignty will have a domino effect, with many states like Kashmir, 
Assam, Manipur, and the Maoist movements of central India, making similar 
demands.  Importantly, it will expose India to the strength of China’s 
monopoly in the region, already a major power broker in Southeast Asia, and 
in particular Burma.  
 
Classify and Conquer: Nagas of India and Burma 
The Nagas live between the lower ranges of the Eastern Himalayas in the 
borderlands of Northeast India and Northwest Burma (Myanmar). The label 
‘Naga’ includes a number of ethnic groups, speaking a variety of Tibeto-
Burman languages.  Approximately two million Nagas live in India, and a 
hundred thousand or so in Myanmar’s Sagaing Division and Kachin state.  
Ambiguity over the term ‘Naga’ has never been satisfactorily resolved as it 
was a name not used by the Nagas themselves (see Woodthorpe 1881), which 
continues to highlight the tension between taxonomy and belonging (see 
below).  
 
There are those who argue that Naga collective identity is a modern political, 
cultural, or ‘invented’ category (Baruah 2003) shaped primarily by the forces 
of colonialism and post-colonialism.  Alan Macfarlane (2005) suggests that 
the various Nagas after millennia of wandering ended up in the hills of the 
Eastern Himalayas and only recently coalesced in the patterns the British 
constructed.  Others reject outside historical agents as the sole factor 
responsible for ‘creating’ a Naga identity.  They argue that the Nagas have 
                                                      
6 The Indo-China war centred on border dispute over the Aksai Chin region (between 
Kashmir and Tibet) and Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast India (the now Indian state).  
China wants India to recognise the Aksai Chin region as Chinese territory in return 
for Chinese recognition of Arunachal as Indian.  India, however, is unwilling to 
compromise on both issues (see Maxwell 1970).   
7 Along with the Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Tripura have active 
nationalist movements.       
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shared some common ancestry underpinned by migration stories and creation 
myths (Iralu 2000; Pamei 2001).  For example, Makhel in the Mao Naga 
region of Manipur state in India is recognised as the place of origin for many 
Southern and Western Nagas.   Amongst the Northern and Eastern Nagas, the 
creation myth of Longtrok (in Chuliyimti, Northeast Nagaland), six stones 
shaped as male and female reproductive organs, is believed to be their place 
of origin (Saul 2005: 20-23).   
 
If we are left to adopt a colonial classification or ‘invention’ as the only 
authentic enumeration of identity, then we deny the Nagas active historical 
agency.  On the other hand, privileging Naga narratives prima facie 
uncritically will lead to a form of parochialism that precludes the influence of 
outside historical forces.  Reflecting on South African identity formations, 
Terence Ranger (1993) comments that rather than focus solely on the 
‘invention of tradition’ as colonialism’s legacy to enclose the previous 
dynamism of tradition, it is vital to historicise the ongoing ‘imagining and re-
imagining of tradition’.  This helpful pointer can be useful in the Naga case, 
particularly in understanding the dynamism of Naga identity without 
foreclosing the internal and external processes of identity iteration, a point I 
return to below.  
 
Modern political ‘Naga’ identity: assertion of difference 
Various Naga authors have remarked that the shared experience in the Labour 
Corps during World War I was responsible for a collective and broader sense 
of Naga belonging.  Around 4, 000 Nagas were sent to France as part of the 
Labour Corps, and saw ‘civilised nations’ fight for their own honour while 
condemning Naga conflicts as barbarous, petty squabbles (Yonuo 1974). It 
provided a reason for political unification to represent their claim to the world 
(Alemchiba 1970; Horam 1988). Upon returning home in 1918, they formed 
the Naga Club in 1919 informally supported by the local British 
administrators and organised primarily by Naga Christian educated 
government officials and several headmen around the two principal villages – 
Mokokchung and Kohima.   When the Simon Commission headed by Sir 
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John Simon came to Kohima in 1929, to seek opinions on the future of India, 
twenty Naga tribes signed and submitted a memorandum that stated:  
 
‘…We pray that the British Government will continue to 
safeguard our rights against all encroachments…that we should 
not be thrust to the mercy of the people [i.e. India] who could 
never have conquered us themselves, and to whom we are never 
subjected; but to leave us alone to determine for ourselves as in 
ancient times’ (Alemchiba 1970: 164).   
 
A key aspect of British colonialism in the Naga Hills from the mid-19th 
century was its insistence on difference – the Nagas were allowed to control 
traditional customs and maintain their own identity (Franke 2006).  This form 
of paternalism clearly marked the hierarchy between subjects and rulers.  The 
Indian union, in contrast, argued for a negation of imperialism based on 
consent and self-determination – theoretically ‘a voluntary union of people’.  
Since the Nagas refused to give their consent to this union, the Government 
of India (GOI) deployed military force, which in turn only strengthened the 
cause for Naga independence (Franke 2006: 69-70).  The irony of this 
situation, particularly the denial of self-determination to the Nagas (since 
India only recently gained independence), can only be explained as a 
continuation of the imperial conquest begun by the British.  In a crucial 
departure, it was marked by the inability to assimilate a recalcitrant periphery 
who insisted on difference.           
 
At the centre of this debate was Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of 
India, and the president of the Indian National Congress (INC).  Sensing that 
something had to be done about the ‘tribal’ Naga areas of Northeast India, 
Nehru wrote to T. Sakhrie (the General Secretary of the Naga National 
Council [NNC] formed in February of 1946) on the 1st of August 1946.   In 
his letter, Nehru explained his view that the Naga territory was too small to 
be politically and economically independent.  Nehru evoked the language of 
paternalism – that the ‘backward’ Nagas needed help – and that autonomy 
would be assured to the Nagas with their own laws.  In the same letter, Nehru 
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strongly insisted on the integration of the Nagas within the Indian union and 
Indian laws.  This ambivalence not only highlighted the uncertainty of 
Nehru’s position regarding the Naga Hills, but it departed from the clarity of 
Gandhi’s stand who supported the Nagas in their bid for an independent 
‘Naga area’: ‘…If you do not wish to join the Indian Union…The Congress 
Government will not do that’ (quoted in Venuh 2005: 67).   Things were 
uneven on the ground between the loosely articulated INC stand of no forced 
integration (maintained by its leader Gandhi) to those that were coming from 
other avenues. Canvassing the opinion of the then Assam Governor, who was 
in charge of the Naga Hills which would later go on to form Nagaland, Akbar 
Hydari, regarding a separate solution for the Nagas in 1947, the British 
administrator Mildred Archer writes:  
 
They have got to come in.  If they revolt; we shall shoot them up.  
It will be a pity but it will not be our fault; We couldn’t give Nagas 
residual Powers…A Naga Government is out of the 
question…(quoted in Franke 2006: 73).   
 
Although things were at a stalemate, the NNC entered into dialogue with the 
Governor of Assam, Hydari, and the ‘9-Point Agreement’ was drawn up in 
June 1947 that recognised the right of the NNC to run the affairs of the 
Nagas.  The main bone of contention was point 9 – that is with regard to the 
future of the Nagas.  It was agreed that the Governor of Assam would act as a 
special agent between the GOI and the Nagas for a period of ten years, after 
which the NNC would take a decision regarding the future of the Nagas.  The 
Nagas thought that this clause would enable them to opt out of the union in 
10 years.  This was denied by the GOI.  As a symbolic protest to Indian 
hegemony, the Nagas declared independence on 14th August 1947 signed by 
9 members of the NNC.     
 
In many ways the year 1949 marked a crucial period for the GOI and the 
NNC.  In 1949 the chief minister of Assam, Gopinath Bordoloi, informed the 
NNC that the GOI had never accepted the 9-point agreement.  This was seen 
by the NNC as a betrayal and it is at this juncture that the more moderate 
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NNC members lost ground and a clear majority now wanted total and 
complete independence.  A plebiscite in 1950, conducted by the NNC, was 
meant to echo this sentiment whereby it was recorded that 99.9 percent of the 
Nagas in the Naga Hills supported independence.  This move was summarily 
ignored by the GOI.  Zapuphizo met Nehru again in 1952 by which time the 
situation had worsened to the extent that the GOI was blaming the British for 
encouraging Naga independence (Franke 2006: 74; Jacobs 1998: 159).         
 
The years 1950-56 saw armed escalation on both sides.  This was marked by 
the formation of the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) in 1956, the 
political wing of the NNC.  Political strife started to emerge amongst the 
Nagas, with moderates arguing for negotiation and greater accommodation 
than the uncompromising status quo of complete independence.  The result 
was the Naga People’s Convention (NPC) under the pretext of Naga 
statehood.  In 1963 the new state of Nagaland was inaugurated.   The creation 
of statehood further legitimised the position of the GOI who refused to retreat 
from their idea of national integration, only causing further divisions with the 
NNC.  Armed insurrection continued between the NNC and the Indian 
military that had periodic recesses but the military presence in Nagaland 
continued to build up, which remains a disturbing reality even today.   
 
The Indian military has been accused of serious Human Rights violations, 
beginning with escalated armed conflict from around 1953.  By 1956 a 
hundred thousand Indian soldiers were deployed in the Naga Hills to suppress 
an elusive and tiny guerrilla force with casualties on both sides.  Between 
1956-58 for example the Minority Rights Group estimated that there were 
1400 Naga deaths, and 16 in the Indian military (Maxwell 1973).  In such 
events, casualties extended to both combatants and non-combatants. 
Although, such military excursions were undertaken with the aim of winning 
‘hearts and minds’ – and to help the Nagas feel that they belong to India – the 
pressure of the moment gave way to lapses of reason.  The Indian military 
philosophy of ‘softening up’ the Nagas through sheer military might have 
failed, in part simply due to the length of the guerrilla conflict.  The 
introduction of the 1958 Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) into 
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Nagaland, already classified a ‘disturbed area’ in 1956, introduced 
unprecedented powers to stop, search and shoot to kill as necessary.   This 
only fuelled mistrust and disdain of the Indian military.  Translate this 
scenario on the ground and this is what you have: a blatant disregard for the 
Nagas.   
 
Kanwar Randip Singh, a former Indian officer, who served in the Naga Hills 
from 1953-57, says that none of the Indian officers bothered mixing with the 
Nagas nor learn their way of life.  ‘In fact, they considered these people as 
subhuman, filthy and not worth mixing…a big gap was created between the 
Nagas and the government after the British left’ (quoted in Glancey 2011: 
180).  Another view from John Bosco Jasokie, a former Chief Minister of 
Nagaland, interprets what these attitudes have meant for the Nagas.   
 
They [the plains people of Hindustan] believe that their way of 
life is the right way…[and] are not prepared to accept us as 
human beings and, therefore, it is easier for them to go out of all 
human decency in their dealings with us…they think that by 
harassing the people they have done a great service to India, but 
actually India lost the friendship of the people (quoted in Glancey 
2011: 181).   
 
The NNC were also not innocent in this war – bridges and roads were 
destroyed, kidnappings for extortion, targeted killing of fellow Naga 
moderates, forcible collection of ‘taxes’ and food grains for their forces were 
not uncommon.  In fact, in 1968 in the famous battle of Jotsoma there were 
considerable casualties on the Indian military side.  The exact number eludes 
historical account, but one of the veterans of that battle Brig. Vedayi 
enthusiastically told the journalist Bertil Lintner that: ‘…I’m a good 
Christian.  I don’t tell lies.  We killed at least 1,000 Indians!  And our soldiers 
shouted “Praise the Lord!” every time they fired their weapons’ (Lintner 
1990: 85).  Following on from political dialogues, and military operations in 
the region, the Peace Council of Nagaland, comprising eminent Naga figures, 
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tried to bring the various parties to the peace table on different occasions 
initiated by the Council of the Baptist Churches of Nagaland in 1964.   
 
Peace talks eventually collapsed in 1966 due to the uncompromising rival 
claims of territorial sovereignty and the NNC was banned by the GOI in 
1972.  With increased Indian military pressure and the uncertainty of Chinese 
influence on some of its cadres who went to China on a ‘goodwill mission’, 
the controversial ‘Shillong Accord’ was signed in Shillong on 11 November 
1975 between the GOI and the FGN of Nagaland.   This required the 
surrender and disarmament of the NNC and the de facto ‘official’ recognition 
of the constitution of India.  When the Nagas who went on the ‘goodwill 
mission’ to China heard about these events, they immediately denounced the 
NNC as traitors to the Naga cause and formed their own group known as the 
NSCN (the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland) under the leadership of 
Isak Swu, T. Muivah, and S.S. Khaplang on 31 January 1980.  Due to internal 
conflicts, and perhaps due to personality clashes, Khaplang, a Naga from 
Burma, split from the NSCN in 1988 to form his own group (NSCN-K).  The 
remaining group came to be known as the NSCN-IM, after their leaders, Isak 
Swu and T. Muivah.  The latter is the most powerful group in the region.   
 
On 1st August 1997, fifty years since the conflict began, a ceasefire was 
signed between the GOI and the NSCN-IM, and political negotiation at the 
highest level was to be held in a third country.  So far the talks have included 
the main – but contentious – point of Nagalim (or ‘Greater Nagaland’) that 
includes Naga inhabited areas of Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, 
Manipur and Burma.  The aim of the NSCN-IM is that all Naga inhabited 
areas must be conjoined, if any viable settlement is to be reached through the 
talks.  Ceasefire agreements have also been signed with the NSCN-K and 
other Naga factions.   It is worth reiterating that the present Nagalim (or 
Greater Nagaland) is an attempt to bring all the Nagas living in India and 
Burma under one political reality which is sought by the NSCN-IM.  The 
NNC on the other hand sought only independence of the Naga Hills (which 
eventually went on to become the Indian state of Nagaland). 
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Territorialising Christianity 
The period marking the beginnings of intense military operations and the 
resistance to it from 1947 to the 1970s witnessed a substantial rise in the scale 
of conversions to Baptist Christianity among the Nagas of Nagaland.  
Although the numbers of Christian conversions were nothing revelatory until 
1941 (17.9% from a population of around 189,641), a sharp rise in Christian 
numbers post-1941 has a story to tell.  In 1951 there is an increase to around 
52.9%, an additional 30% in ten years.  The increase in the Christian 
population is steady from then on with 80.2% recorded in 1981 (Eaton 2000: 
48), and in 2001 the number is almost 95%, mainly made up of Baptists, 
Presbyterians, Roman Catholics and Pentecostals.   Part of my argument is 
that there is a correlation between Christian conversion and progress in Naga 
nationalism, which is demonstrated not only by the statistical data but also by 
the performance and narratives of Christianity.  One of the main reasons is 
that it provided the majority of Nagas with some internal cohesion and gave 
them a ‘moral authority’ that superseded parochial ‘tribal’ loyalties.  Both 
would play its part on the international stage.         
 
‘Nagaland for Christ’: Evangelical nationalism 
The idea that Christianity for the Nagas is an irreversible fact appears daily in 
the local press and even efforts to revive ‘Nagaland for Christ’ is a daily 
plebiscite.  In 2009, the ‘Restore Nagaland for Christ Crusade’ was seen in 
one of Nagaland’s main town Dimapur, organised by the United Christian 
Prayer Ministries (UCPM).  Thuingaleng Muivah the General Secretary of 
NSCN-IM reiterates, in many instances, two central motifs: ‘Nagaland for 
Christ’ and ‘the unique national rights of the Naga people’ (often articulated 
as Urra Uvie [our land belongs to us]).  Indeed, during his speech in 
Pughoboto in Zeneboto district of Nagaland in 24th June 2010 the tone of his 
speech almost takes a messianic undercurrent: ‘We [referring to himself and 
the Chairman Isak Swu] are united on two key foundations: 1) The will of 
Jehovah 2) Our land and the National Rights of the Naga people’ (NSCN 
publication 2010: 36).   Evangelisation and nationalism go hand in hand here.   
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This is a point made assiduously by Paul Freston (2001).  His focus is on the 
interaction between evangelicals and politics around the world that ties in 
specifically with the New Divinity theology of the 19th century American 
missions.8  He mentions four general characteristics that make this link 
explicit: conversionism (emphasis on revival); activism (emphasis on 
evangelical and missionary activity); biblicism (emphasis on the Bible 
without inerrancy); and crucicentrism (emphasis on Christ’s sacrifice on the 
cross) (2001: 2).  His assessment clearly places the Naga national movements 
(NNC and the NSCN factions) within this camp (2001: 85-92).             
 
In the early days of the NNC, gospel teams preached under armed guard and 
conducted many spiritual activities in their jungle camps.  For example, the 
NNC refused to fight on Sundays, due to the large numbers of pastors in their 
ranks.  The UK newspaper Observer’s Gavin Young, in his book The Nagas: 
An Unknown War, offers us vignettes of his experience in the nationalist 
jungle camps in the 1960s.  When the Naga platoon assigned to accompany 
him kneels down to pray, he remarks that it is akin to a ‘Cromwellian 
ingredient in the Naga struggle’.  In the camp, over the officer’s mess were 
these words: ‘Praise God from whom all blessings flow, Praise him all 
creatures here below’ (quoted in Glancey 2011: 183).  The NNC even created 
a Naga flag with a rainbow intersecting a blue sky, a reference to God’s 
covenant with Noah in Genesis, symbolised here as God’s covenant with the 
Nagas.9   
 
Similarly, when the Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner meets the NSCN at 
their Headquarters in Burma, he recounts how every meeting would open 
with a prayer and Bible reading usually by Isak Swu (1990: 82).  As a 
                                                      
8 Alongside this, New Divinity also emphasised the dawn of the millennium, 
influenced by Jonathan Edward’s view that Christ’s return would not be a 
cataclysmic event, but would be achieved through benevolent activities, social 
reform, and missionary outreach.  In a way, Edward’s millennialism conjoined 
‘revivalism and missions in a providential scheme’.  This admixture proved to be 
extremely potent, especially when combined with American nationalism (as a beacon 
of gospel light to the world) (Kling 2004: 19-20).   
9 Daily Herald, May 5, 2003.   
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propaganda tool, the NSCN even claimed that the ‘Hindu government’ of 
India has adopted a policy of vegetarianism that will be enforced upon the 
Nagas.  The NSCN preached a puritanical lifestyle that banned alcohol and 
drugs, and discouraged sexual promiscuity.  Schools and clinics were 
established that went hand in hand with Christian teachings (Horam 1988: 76-
77).  Biblical names such as Zion, Canaan or the NSCN-IM headquarter 
Hebron, are used as camp names that signify the pervasiveness of Judeo-
Christian symbols. 
 
It is the NSCN, and later the NSCN-IM, who have made it their mission for a 
free Nagaland explicitly Christian, a powerful evangelical motif. Their 1980 
Manifesto is perhaps the clearest sign of this. 
1. Unquestionable rights of the Naga people over every inch of 
Nagaland.   
2. Dictatorship of the people through the NSCN and practice of 
democracy as long as it is deemed necessary.   
3. Faith in God and salvation of mankind through Jesus Christ. 
4. Socialism and economic systems for the removal of exploitation and 
ensuring fair equality to all the people.   
5. Rules out saving of Nagaland through peaceful means and pins its 
faith on arms to save the Nation and to ensure freedom to its people 
(quoted in Glancey 2011: 188).   
 
The above represents an odd conflation of Maoist socialist ideology, 
Christian salvationism (‘Nagaland for Christ’) and armed insurrection 
followed by an appeal to democracy, but only as a stepping-stone to 
dictatorship of the people.  However, it is that of Christian salvationism that 
has been the cornerstone for the NSCN-IM in their fight against the Indian 
state.   They incorporate an almost prophetic vision of Nagalim that combines 
an evangelical and soteriological theology, and providence for the Naga 
nation through the Old Testament idea of ‘chosenness’.  In the discussion so 
far I have demonstrated that Christianity enables a move from ‘tribal’ 
loyalties to ‘national’ solidarity through the deconstruction of internal 
boundaries.  However, internal factional feuds (sometimes along ‘tribal 
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lines’) have erupted since the forming of the various nationalist groups, 
which has questioned the ‘universality’ of Naga nationhood: the Ao against 
the Angami; the Tanghkul against the Konyak and so on (see Sashinungla 
2005).  Muivah in fact tells Lintner that tribalism is a ‘malignant bacteria’ 
affecting the solidarity of the Naga people (1986: 25).  In this national, and 
modernist, vision, tribal loyalties are seen to disrupt the efficacy of one 
people, one nation.  Is this attempt at a singular nation skewed with modernist 
(and socialist?) frames of reference? Does the existence of a nation always 
require ‘full consciousness’ of all its members (Duara 1995)? 
 
Adrian Hastings suggests that it would be unreasonable to measure this 
participation from the vantage point of our contemporary mass-media society.  
For example, rightly or wrongly, black slaves in America were not included 
or offered to be part of the American nation in 1776, even though we 
acknowledge that date as axiomatic (Hastings 1997: 25-26).  Nor did peasants 
in early modern Europe have any sense of being a part of it (Weber 1976).   
Does this mean that nations are any less real because the formation of identity 
is neither singular nor exclusive?  Speaking about the Karen National Union’s 
(KNU) vision of a Karen nation in Burma, Michael Gravers (1996) argues 
that differing views coming from Karens due to place (village, region, 
country), status (Christian, Animist, Buddhist) and situation influence the 
configuration of identification.  He suggests that the Karen nation still exists 
regardless of these differences.     
 
In the Naga case, even nationalist and popular sentiments have splintered.  
Christianity as a common identity is also challenged by non-Christians like 
the Heraka movement, who deploy their resources against Naga Christianity 
but affirm Naga nationhood (Longkumer 2010).  Outside historical forces 
have undoubtedly influenced the Nagas, but the Nagas have been active 
participants in the making of their own history regardless of these 
incongruities.  Here we see the normalising project of nationalist modernity 
disrupted by the fragmented resistances to that project (Chatterjee 1993: 13).  
Nevertheless, the dominant ideology of Christianity, alongside its 
visualisation of nationhood, has informed much of the historical and 
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contemporary discussions on Naga nationalism.  The indigenous peoples 
movement and the focus on self-determination provides another avenue to 
explore notions of Naga sovereignty that questions the ideology, and sole 
authority, of Christianity to mobilise identities.                          
 
Recognition of difference: UN and Indigenous Peoples 
Another factor that decisively makes such a claim transnational – the ‘moral’ 
weight to Naga self-determination – are those propounded by UN ideas of 
human rights.  It works in favour of the Nagas due to its universal resonances, 
particularly that of self-determination and sovereignty based on indigenous 
people’s rights.  In her work amongst the Chiapas of Mexico, Heidi Moksnes 
highlights this very central point:  
‘…discourse about local suffering has become transformed into 
one about global injustice… For many Catholic villagers, 
therefore, the regulations of international bodies are the secular 
versions of the universal justice that they regard God as having 
proclaimed.  In this fusion of the sacred/secular, the United 
Nations has here acquired a central role, perceived by villagers in 
Chiapas as the main international ally in the political struggle for 
grassroots justice’ (2007: 603).   
 
Similarly, a vital element to nationalist motivations is the ‘moral’ idea of the 
rights of peoples – particularly on the right to self-determination – which 
constitutes the terms of struggle for people who have been denied political 
presence.  The right to self-determination occurred under various guises.  
First, calls for self-governance occurred with the demise of the various 
European empires after World War II and gradually many subject nations, 
once under colonial domination, gained independence.  If the disintegration 
of the empires and the collective self-governance of independent nation-states 
marked the beginning of some sort of high point in international relations, the 
growing number of national movements within national states claiming 
independence only complicates and questions such a picture.  As discussed, 
in India alone the numbers astound.  Second, if the ‘moral’ right to national 
self-determination has been one of the cornerstones for self-governance, it is 
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also one of the most contentious issues facing many countries with a large 
indigenous population, including India.  The current debate on self-
determination implies a people’s right to decide its political status freely, 
including the right to secede.  Indigenous activists contend that the fact that 
they are treated unequally to other people is a blatant disregard of 
international law (Muehlebach 2001: 439).                      
In the light of this, are the worldviews and ambitions of the nation-state a 
helpful signifier to think about what it means to belong?  What are some of 
the conceptual tools that enable people to reach beyond the territorial 
boundaries of national states and ‘imagine’ themselves as part and parcel of 
‘universal’ ideas that are legitimate rights for claim?  One way to think about 
these questions is centred on the notion of ‘sovereignty’ and what it means to 
be a people in a world system.   
 
Sovereignty and its discontents 
In textbook definitions, sovereignty usually means that the sovereign – a 
person, organisation, or institution – decides on all matters relating to lawful 
conduct and adjudicates on the legitimate use of coercion (Graham 2008: 13).  
Sovereignty as a political concept then is central to questions of authority.  
The state not only has the rightful authority but also the exercise of power.  
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), the English political philosopher, articulated 
this position most effectively in his magnum opus, Leviathan. Hobbes argued 
that the main effects of producing sovereignty are the ordering of difference 
that secures and safeguards a ‘sovereign unit’.  Through flattening and 
ordering time and space, sovereignty, for Hobbes, is a civic response to the 
divine authority of God.  By bracketing religious authority, sovereignty as a 
political doctrine is made explicit (Shaw 2008: 37).  For Hobbes all people 
are capable of commonwealth (sovereignty) exemplified by progress, order, 
culture, art and science.  This Hobbesian notion is very much centred on 
‘“man” as a “knowing subject”’: ‘the subject (who knows with authority) and 
the sovereign state (who embodies/ guarantees this authority)’ (Shaw 2008: 
36).               
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Whereas such Hobbesian conceptions can function within the confines of a 
national state (and perhaps only in Europe?), such an argument means that 
each nation is responsible for its sovereign actions.  Internationalism on the 
other hand holds the view that ‘national actions are rightly subject to the 
wider international community, and thus that sovereignty does not ultimately 
lie with the nation-state’ (Graham 2008: 13; italics in original).  It is this latter 
view that holds much currency to recent debates on sovereignty because, as I 
will show, the moral weight of indigenous politics means that various claims 
spill into international waters, making traditional views of sovereignty 
tenuous, at the very least.     
 
I will argue that sovereignty is central to rethinking about the political status 
quo, particularly in relation to the state and its citizens.  Part of my argument 
suggests that it is more fruitful to think beyond the state, not solely as a 
politico-territorial entity, but as a ‘moral’ force that can legitimise certain 
claims about belonging.   Karena Shaw makes a similar point when she 
suggests that the territorial state no longer provides the boundary for people’s 
identities, but that these are now expressed in different non-territorial defined 
spaces (2008: 4).  This is partly due to globalisation as a mobile force that 
continues to challenge the proliferation of claims beyond the cosy confines of 
regional or even national politics.  The discourse surrounding indigenous 
people’s movements provides a glimpse to this phenomenon.     
 
Indigenous peoples: a universal language?   
Much ink has been spilled regarding the question of indigenous peoples in 
India (Béteille 1998; Baviskar 2006; Karlsson 2001, 2006; Xaxa 1999) and 
elsewhere (Barnard 2006; Kingsbury 1998).  To sum up the sentiments of one 
of its most keen observer:  
Over a very short period, the few decades since the early 1970s, 
‘indigenous peoples’ has been transformed from a prosaic 
description without much significance in international law and 
politics, into a concept with considerable power as a basis for group 
mobilization, international standard setting, transnational networks 
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and programmatic activity of intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations (Kingsbury 1998: 414).   
 
Ironically, although the term ‘indigenous’ often assumes the power of locality 
to signify its importance, its origins were largely drawn up in global office 
blocks in Geneva and New York.  In a unique way, the indigenous peoples’ 
movement is a transnational effort forged between local actors, international 
activists and organisations.  It primarily involved the drafting of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in partnership with 
the United Nations’ Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), and 
the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Populations, in the main UN hubs 
(Jung 2008: 10-11).  In this sense, as Courtney Jung has argued, indigenous 
identity is both new and global, allowing millions of people to challenge the 
terms of their exclusion.  It is not an accident of birth, but a political 
achievement (2008: 11).  An achievement, in a sense that it not only 
challenges their exclusion, but also formulates a critique of the very 
institutions that propagate law, policies, and entitlements that are meant to 
include.  Therefore, in some sense it might be more fruitful to view 
indigenous identity as political identities, which ‘arises to contest the 
exclusions through which it has been constituted and to try to transform the 
terms of its political presence’ (Jung 2008: 23).             
 
However, in India there are those who argue against the term and question its 
validity.  B.K. Roy Burman (1992), leading the charge, argues that the term 
‘indigenous peoples’ is an imposition by Western interests such as the World 
Bank and the WGIP. 10  Andre Béteille, similarly, argues that its analytical 
vagueness over claims such as land, soil and territory must be understood in 
the context of ‘conquest, spoliation and usurpation’ throughout history 
                                                      
10 Representatives from India in these WGIP forums were generally from the Indian 
Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ICITP) formed in 1987, largely 
under the initiative of Jharkhand activists.  Later, indigenous activists from all over 
India participated in these forums held in Geneva.   It is affiliated with the World 
Council of Indigenous People (Karlsson 2001: 12).  Although the ICITP has been 
active in these international forums, at least in the national arena the term indigenous 
peoples have been very contentious.     
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(Béteille 2006: 29).  Therefore, sorting out who is ‘indigenous’ enters another 
difficult, and often dangerous, terrain with regard to the politics of place.  
Another sphere that is often muddled is the question of the interface between 
tribe/adivasi (or original settlers) and indigenous peoples (see Karlsson and 
Subba 2006).  In India, for example, the term ‘tribe’ is being increasingly 
replaced with indigenous peoples, without any qualification.  To be 
recognised as tribes – officially as Scheduled Tribes – is attractive as it 
continues to provide positive discrimination in the form of quotas for jobs 
and education at a national level. On the other hand, the rights promulgated 
by the UN provide recognition (and publicity) for the cultural and land abuses 
carried out by the Indian state.  The ‘moral’ sanction in the form of human 
rights abuses brings about some accountability and responsibility for national 
states towards indigenous peoples.  Therefore, due to the proliferation of 
these ideas indigenous peoples are a ‘social fact’ in India (Baviskar 2006).  
Tribes/indigenous peoples are both used strategically.   
 
Complicating indigeneity 
In the case of the Nagas, the claims to indigeneity are different from other 
communities within India, and it must be stressed that there isn’t a singular 
‘indigenous’ platform that all ascribe to.  Indeed, indigeneity is a difficult 
notion to explain in the Naga context because of its asymmetrical 
articulations of belonging.  As I have already discussed the historical 
development and crystallisation of the term ‘Naga’ was an outside imposition 
without a clear precedent.  In some way, this taxonomy is still unclear when 
considering the politics of place.  For example, during the Hornbill Festival in 
Nagaland, I was told by many Kachari, Garo, and Kuki people living in 
Nagaland that although they are recognised ‘officially’ by the Government of 
Nagaland as ‘Naga’, the other Naga tribes do not give such recognition.   
 
For them [Kachari, Garo, Kuki] territorial indigeneity is the sole 
marker of Naga identity, not blood, language or customary 
practices.  Although they have kin relations elsewhere: the Garo 
(in Meghalaya); the Kachari (in Assam); and the Kuki (in 
Assam/Manipur/Mizoram), they say they are Nagas and have 
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nothing to do with their kin (although cultural ties are strongly 
maintained through marriage). When one Kuki lady said that 
they are not ‘Naga’, she was quickly reprimanded for her 
foolishness. The politics of the moment necessitates their 
inclusion into the Naga fold (Longkumer 2013: 94).   
 
This is a point reiterated by a human rights activist but with caution.11  He 
said that ‘we can’t impose this “Naganess” on people who don’t want to be 
Naga, but for people who also want to be considered as Nagas, we are there 
to give them room.  But the fact is, by blood and history, just anybody cannot 
be Nagas.  So that is also a fact.  Both you and I know that the Kachari and 
Garo are not really Naga, it was more of a concession by the Government of 
Nagaland’.  This is a problem that remains unresolved primarily due to a 
certain perception of Naga identity related to common myths of origin and 
migration as discussed earlier.  But what happens to those, such as Nepali 
immigrants, who have been in Nagaland since the time of the British?  As a 
way forward to this impasse, a Naga informant said that ‘no identity is 
without boundaries.  But boundaries need to be permeable in this global age 
and go beyond static identity formations’.  In a way, this identity formation is 
a messy process, a paradox: it resists neat classification and resolution, while 
also policing its boundaries.  However, such a possibility opens up space for 
the historicisation of identity, as it is re-imagined in current contexts.  Only 
time will tell how Naga identity will evolve.  
 
Naga delegates, primarily from the NSCN-IM, have been the most active 
‘ethnic’ group in the WGIP since 1987 (Muehlebach 2001: 420).  Although, 
they explicitly do not claim the indigenous people’s mantle, they assert that 
they are an independent nation fighting a war of resistance against the Indian 
and Burmese Governments (Karlsson 2006: 58).  In the light of this, their 
claims are primarily that of self-determination and national sovereignty as ‘an 
inalienable birth right’ based on article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
                                                      
11 All informants are anonymous due to the sensitive nature of this topic.   
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of Indigenous Peoples.12   Indeed, the Naga case brings up a thorny issue with 
regard to indigenous peoples and whether self-determination equals 
‘secessionism’.   
 
Isak Swu the President of the NSCN-IM in these WGIP sessions in the early 
1990s argued for an ‘independent’ Naga nation, bringing about some anxiety 
within the WGIP, which explicitly promulgates the position that it is against 
the break-up of existing nation-states (Karlsson 2006: 58).  A seasoned 
human rights activist and also a regular attendee to these UN meetings told 
me that although UN members are uncomfortable with the term 
‘independence’, the facts have to be expressed: ‘we are not Indians and we 
have the right to self-determination’.  Some of the anxiety has been mitigated 
by the change of focus for the Naga groups who now stress more on human 
rights violations and the on-going peace process with the GOI and the 
subsequent impact this would have on any future political settlement.13 So 
what exactly is Naga sovereignty? 
 
Naga sovereignty: God, land, people 
According to the Yehzabo (constitution) of Nagaland:  
We, the people of Nagaland, solemnly acknowledge that the 
Sovereignty over the earth and the entire universe belongs to 
Almighty God alone, and the authority of the people to be exercised 
on the territory is a sacred trust from God, who sustained our 
forefathers, the national workers and our people through the 
years…(Fellowship of Naga Reconciliation document 2012).   
 
In a way the uniqueness of Naga sovereignty has to do with the two-fold 
understanding of Christianity and indigenous politics that is woven into the 
texture of Naga national identity.  While Christianity provides much ‘moral’ 
                                                      
12 Article 3 states that Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination.  By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
13 See reports generated by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 
(IWGIA) and the archives maintained by doCip (documents of the UN Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues [PFII]).  See for example archives from May 20, 2002, 
New York, USA; May 10-21, 2004; May 15, 2012.    
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cohesion as I have already discussed, indigenous peoples’ rights connect with 
transnational systems bringing wider attention, participation, and 
responsibility.  Both, though differently expressed, are concerned with the 
question of sovereignty and self-determination based on difference 
(Christianity) and recognition (UN).  Above all, as my informants reminded 
me on several occasions, sovereignty in the Naga context is tied in with the 
ownership of land.  ‘One is often confused with the term sovereignty’ one of 
my informants said, ‘because we are still stuck with colonial and imperial 
notions of it’.  Regardless of the different theories, he said, we need to 
acknowledge that sovereignty lies with the people.  When I probed whether 
Christianity and sovereignty are intertwined as in the above constitution, he 
said:  
You can talk about God granting sovereignty in a spiritual 
sense, but politically you cannot claim that.  I’m not saying that 
there is a separation between Christianity and the political in our 
context: to say that Jesus Christ is our saviour is also a political 
statement.  Sovereignty has to be rational – and we need to 
distinguish between the rational and the spiritual sphere.  Some 
separation is required because once you co-opt Christianity for 
political ends – that is co-opting what is mystical for political 
gain – it is fanatical and irrational.       
 
Perhaps he is thinking about the sort of brash evangelical nationalism that I 
discussed earlier, which, as he argues, ‘has no particular place in our 
postmodern society’.  He admonished the divinatory aspects of nationalism – 
from prayers, prophecies to dreams – that promise independence for a more 
reasoned, secular, and temporal approach.  Instead of appealing to an overtly 
religious exclusivism, civic notions that appeal to human dignity, rights, and 
laws that can be documented, argued, and traced are proving to be more 
attractive for the Nagas. Without doubt Christianity has historically shaped 
and influenced Naga nationhood, but the question is: can Christianity 
continue to provide that universalising visualisation of nationhood?  Instead 
of co-opting Christianity as a blunt instrument for ideology, informants 
suggest a more ground-up approach that integrates local custom and 
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sovereignty, without minimising the influence of Christianity.  Therefore, 
secular institutions like the UN provide a more legitimate basis precisely 
because it is ‘universal’ and not sectarian: it represents ‘grassroots justice’ 
regardless of location (Moksnes 2007: 603).  This secular version is more 
useful because it implies that sovereignty emerges from overlapping loyalties.  
First, it can reach to Nagas in different locations.  Second, it allows 
Christians, non-Christians, and non-Nagas to be encompassed in the identity.  
Third, assertion of UN ideas of human rights gives it a transnational and 
‘moral’ weight which questions traditional forms of sovereignty.       
 
However, notions promulgated by the UN are actually not ‘secular’ in the 
strict sense because of the way indigenous peoples movements are utilising 
the rhetoric of spirituality, where even ceremonial prayers have been used to 
open WGIP meetings (Muehlebach 2001: 426). In the Naga case, it is likely 
that Christianity – in its more liberal guise – has given way to a more 
inclusive, neutral ‘spiritual’ articulation of a Naga political identity that could 
be approved by the UN.  The ambiguous terrain of the ‘spiritual’ is then more 
attractive because, in a sense, most indigenous peoples have some ‘spiritual’ 
connection with land, culture and community, regardless of religious 
affiliation.  This kind of appeal to reviving an indigenous identity is not 
uncommon among indigenous peoples around the world, often couched in the 
language of ‘a spiritual revolution, a culturally rooted social movement that 
transforms the whole of society and a political action that seeks to remake the 
entire landscape of power and relationship to reflect truly a liberated post-
imperial vision’ (Alfred 2005: 27; emphasis in original).  A human rights 
activist in Nagaland reiterated some of these points:  
Indigenous peoples in Asia and in Nagaland are trying to 
maximise these rights [UN indigenous peoples rights] and trying 
to implement them in our local communities.  Alongside this, 
we are also writing our stories, reviving our customary ways of 
life within the Asian fora.  We are also running workshops 
amongst communities as we are trying to re-energise the 
indigenous way of life as we work with different local actors. 
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Various policy makers have acknowledged this revival, and Dalee Sambo 
Dorough from the Indian Law Resource Center has in fact addressed this 
point in one of the WGIP meetings.  I quote it in full to highlight the 
important discussion:  
Narrower conceptions of the term peoples (and self-determination) 
are flawed in their limited vision of a world divided into mutually 
exclusive ‘sovereign’ territorial communities.  This limited 
conception of peoples largely ignores the multiple, overlapping 
spheres of community, authority and interdependency that actually 
exist in the human experience.  This vision corresponds with the 
traditional Western theoretical perspective that limits humanity to 
two perceptual categories – the individual and the state – and which 
views states according to a model of mutually exclusive spheres of 
territory, community and centralized authority.  This conception 
obscures the human rights character of self-determination and 
diminishes self-determination values in a world that is in fact 
evolving differently from one concerned only with statehood 
categories… 
Properly understood, the principle of self-determination benefits 
groups, that is ‘peoples’, in the ordinary sense of the term throughout 
the spectrum of humanity’s complex web of interrelationships and 
loyalties, and not just peoples defined by existing or perceived 
sovereign boundaries.  In a world of increasingly overlapping and 
integrated political spheres, self-determination concerns the 
constitution and functioning of all levels and forms of governments 
(quoted in Muehlebach 2001: 440).   
 
There are two issues with what Sambo Dorough proposes here with regard to 
the triangular notion of people, self-determination and sovereignty.  First, it 
reframes the debate not in current forms of bounded groups, but calls for a 
more sophisticated rendering of people as mobile, relational, and ‘their 
loyalties overlapping rather than defined by identities linked to bounded 
territories only’ (Muehlebach 2001: 440).  This view is particularly apt for the 
Nagas of India and Burma who have been historically divided into these two 
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countries and into various states within.  What the Nagas have been asking 
for is some form of overlapping sovereignty or ‘Greater Nagaland/Nagalim’14 
that not only emotionally binds people across state and national borders, but 
also seeks some sort of mechanical solidarity that enables the people to have 
a common system of governance and polity.  This brings about the second 
issue. What Sambo Dorough proposes can be viewed as a very diffused and 
unstable phenomenon.  It leaves uncertain which government has the final 
authority, and indeed, the power to enforce that authority, in contrast to ‘true 
sovereignty’, a point highlighted by Hobbes.  Otherwise, there is a danger of 
perpetual prospect of conflict.  In this sense, ‘overlapping sovereignty’ 
between different political structures is hard to correspond with some sort of 
‘mechanical solidarity’ at this current juncture.  Some of the overtures made 
by the Indian state signal a move to address these two issues (see below), but 
the question of what kind of authority that will supervise Naga sovereignty 
remains to be seen.  
 
Rethinking sovereign power 
What the above clarion call requires is a rethinking of sovereignty that allows 
the Nagas and indigenous peoples to negotiate their place in the world, 
without it being automatically assigned.  Deleuze and Guattari suggest that 
one way out of this quagmire is ‘rhizomatic’ thought.  They argue that 
Western thought has been obsessed with the ‘arboreal’ image – that of a tree: 
a single trunk supporting many branches.  This kind of thought, they argue, 
produces less multiplicity because it always returns to the original unity, 
reminiscent of the Hobbesian model.  Rhizomatic thought on the other hand 
is ‘any point [that] can be connected to anything other, and must be.  This is 
very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order’ (1987: 
7). 
 
This sort of disruption provided by rhizomatic thought is not something that 
can be severed from arboreal thought, however.  Both coexist in crucial ways 
because ‘there exist tree or root structure in rhizomes’ (1987: 15).  The point 
                                                      
14 Greater Nagaland or Nagalim includes the state of Nagaland and Naga inhabited 
areas of India (Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh) and Burma. 
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however for Deleuze and Guattari is to explore existing possibilities and to 
think differently, particularly when the arboreal structure of the state affects 
diverse actors.  For Deleuze and Guattari, the recalcitrant peripheries of the 
state (such as the ‘primitive’ or non-state actors) always resist resonance, to 
produce sovereignty.  If one were to apply this logic to the Nagas as non-state 
actors, they represent the disruption of the normalising project of the Indian 
state.  Deflecting this state organising resonance brings about an identity 
marked by difference (Shaw 2008: 166).  If one looks at it from another 
angle, these positions ironically cannot be absolved primarily because the risk 
of gaining recognition from the state for the Nagas means forgoing their 
political aspirations and to be subject to the authority of the state.  On the 
other hand, recognition by the state is ‘dependent upon the exclusion and 
marginalization of those who mark its edges, its failures’ (Shaw 2008: 170).  
This is an important problem that Deleuze and Guattari are trying to 
highlight.  The aim is not to attempt to find an inclusive, one size fits all, type 
of sovereignty but to ‘use its exclusions to demonstrate and reshape its very 
limits’ (Shaw 2008: 174).  In a way, the power of resonance will always 
create resistance.     
 
What this discussion points to, for our purposes, is to realise that the arboreal 
structure of the modern nation-states are constructed around the cumulative 
tradition of Western political theory, which requires that conflict be resolved 
through the framework of governance and the constitution.  Although marked 
by these debates, we need to extend beyond to rethink sovereignty through 
indigenous frameworks that usher in the possibility of hope.  Recently, it is 
alleged, the Indian state has offered to establish a ‘supra state body’ as the 
final political resolution to the protracted conflict with the Nagas.15  Its 
proposal to incorporate all Naga inhabited areas of Assam, Nagaland, 
Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, first of all recognises the ‘distinct identity’ 
of the Nagas and ensures the protection of the rights of Nagas who will 
oversee the ‘cultural, traditional and other aspects of Naga life’.   
                                                      
15 Some of the numerous Naga national groups, in negotiations with the GOI in the 
on-going peace process, have dismissed this as untrue. See The Sangai Express, 14 
November 2011: http://www.thesangaiexpress.com/sangai -
expressnews.php?newsid=10650 (accessed 23rd November 2012). 
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Such a position has been advocated by scholars like N.K Das (2011).  He 
suggests a non-territorial model of Naga sovereignty within the existing (and 
flexible) Indian constitution, akin to the Sami autonomy pact that gives them 
powers (in the form of parliaments) in three European states – Norway, 
Sweden, Finland – to determine their own traditional livelihoods, make 
decisions on development, teaching of the Sami language, and social and 
health services.  Roy Burman, an Indian anthropologist, has called this 
process ‘internal self-determination’ (that provides non-territorial jurisdiction 
with legislative, administrative, judicial and developmental powers to the 
Nagas).  Although this does not guarantee independence, it nevertheless has 
elements of ‘external self-determination’ (Das 2011: 76) that is similar to 
some sort of overlapping sovereignty that gives recognition and power to the 
Nagas across far flung places.  This is the kind of sovereignty that I suspect 
will have more currency in the current political climate.     
 
Such a view however has been mooted by the existing states; they see this as 
an attempt by the Indian state to break up its existing territories for some 
form of Naga irredentism that will erode centuries of common histories 
between different communities.16  Others, like the NNC, recently stated that 
they do not share these ‘supra-state’ designs.  Their position is more of a 
traditional form of sovereignty that demands complete territorial 
independence.  The NNC secretary L. Kaiso said in a press release in 
November 2012: ‘Having brought various Naga regional units together into 
one federated union on March 22, 1956, the integration of Nagaland and the 
formation of the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN) was completed’.17  
Different views are articulated, which is why civic groups like the Fellowship 
of Naga Reconciliation (FNR) are attempting to shape a common platform for 
Naga sovereignty.   
 
                                                      
16 Naga Integration Movement: Redefining Irredentism: 
http://www.thesangaiexpress.com/tseitm-20931-naga-integration-movement-
redefining-irredentism/ (accessed 23rd of November 2012).   
17 NNC poohs-poohs settlement process http://www.thesangaiexpress.com/tseitm-
21015-nnc-poohspoohs-settlement-process/ (accessed 19/11/2013).   
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What I am suggesting in this paper is that there are possibilities to rework 
notions of sovereignty, such as the aforementioned points by Das and the 
indigenous peoples’ movements.  As I have discussed, ideas of sovereignty 
are complex, fluid and in the process of becoming – that also give rise to 
internal incongruities – rather than a final, given product that is borne out of 
history, culture, and religious belonging.    It calls for specific local 
formations dependent on the time and place. 
 
Conclusion: Towards a ‘moral geography’ 
Nationalism historically has relied on the political and geographical territories 
marked by the nation-state (see also Chatterjee 1993).  This paper has 
however emphasised how the moral idea of geography through Christian and 
indigenous peoples’ rights has shaped the Nagas’ understanding of belonging.  
To this effect, Christianity has provided an important narrative.   
 
First, Christianity brought about a parallel nation-building project linking the 
Nagas with the forces of colonialism and modernity in a distinct fashion.  
Although they were incorporated into the Indian state upon Britain’s 
departure, they nevertheless asserted their difference: that the making of a 
Naga nation did not share the consciousness of being an ‘Indian’.  Second, 
the representation of a territory which Sack argues must communicate a sign 
or marker of identity is articulated in the iconic representation of ‘Nagaland 
for Christ’.  It depicts a cartographic national space that is visualised as 
inherently Christian, as a beacon of gospel light.  Third, the primordial right 
to a nation, which is resolutely eternal and natural is inseparable from land, 
national identity and sovereignty, is premised on the Bible.  Quoting Acts 17: 
26 from the New Testament, Kaka Iralu says ‘And he (God) made from one 
(Adam) every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having 
determined their appointed times and the boundaries of their habitation’.  For 
him, the Indo-Naga conflict is understood as a spiritual war that is ‘a result of 
India’s violation of these universal laws with respect to Nagaland’ (2000:1-
2).  Therefore, it is important to note that spirituality can often lay claim to 
the material landscapes, and it is precisely this spirituality that makes such 
claims more powerful.    
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Through transnational links with organisations like the UN, the Nagas are 
involved in articulating a form of sovereignty that requires a rethink of the 
role of the nation-state as the sole arbiter of legitimacy and authority.  Much 
of this understanding derives from the Hobbesian model of a strong national 
state that has the authority to shape a singular identity.   However, this 
definition is unhelpful for a number of reasons but chief among them is the 
understanding of nations within nation-states prevalent in the global situation 
today.  Indeed, with the emphasis being placed on indigenous peoples’ 
sovereignty, we begin to consider how a nation might be defined, and this has 
more to do with a sense of belonging.  Combining these two registers is 
useful in the Naga context but not without its own complications.  It is still 
unclear how territorially indigenous Nagas can be fully recognised as ‘Naga’ 
if the criterion for belonging is still common migration stories, creation myths 
and questions over authenticity based on blood.  Further still, the question 
over non-Christians is another problem that cannot be resolved if Christianity 
is viewed as axiomatic with ethnic identity.  Part of this shift, as I have 
discussed, revolves around the notion of a secular Naga identity that is 
cautious about its evangelical and ideological strands of Christianity, while 
appealing more to reason and temporality based on human dignity and 
inclusion.  If this is the manner in which Naga sovereignty were to progress it 
would automatically incorporate a plural constellation of people regardless of 
religious belonging.  There is evidence to suggest that this is a possibility that 
is open to discussion amongst many of the informants that I interacted with.   
 
Finally, not only is it the case that defining the Naga nation along physical 
territorial lines is insufficient but it is only by considering the ‘moral 
geography’ or their sense of belonging that we can understand properly the 
way in which this nation could be defined as territoriality, as the organisation 
of space.  Seeking legitimation and recognition through different rights 
accorded by the UN provides an avenue for further thinking about the limits 
and disruptions of the nation-state, not only in India but elsewhere.      
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